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Re c e n t  De v e l o pm e n t s  i n  Natu ra l  Re s o u r c e s  La w -Ci r c a  1996
Th o m a s  A. Daily 1
Ju d i c ia l  De v e l o pm e n t s
Ta k e -o r -pa y  Se t t l e m e n t  Is s u e s , In c l u d i n g  Ro ya lt y  
Ow n e r  Cl a i m s  a n d  a  Se v e r a n c e  Tax  D i s pu t e , Fil l  t h e  Ju d i c i a l  Air
A number of cases were decided in 1996 which involved the right to share in 
settlements of take-or-pay claims. Probably the most notorious of these reemerged under 
the name of Klein v. Arkoma Production Co.2 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals heard, 
for the second time, the class action case involving the take-or-pay deal that bought the 
Dallas Cowboys. Here is the deal:
1. Jerral Jones and Michael McCoy owned Arkoma Production Company which had 
a substantial take-or-pay claim against Arkla, Inc.3
2. In a most creative settlement, Jones and McCoy sold all of Arkoma’s stock to 
Arkla Exploration Company4 for a lot of money.
3. Arkla, Inc. then successfully negotiated with its new corporate subsidiary to 
release the onerous contract containing the take-or-pay provision..
The class, composed of Cecil and Aetna Field royalty owners, sought a portion of the 
purchase price paid to Jones and McCoy for the stock as the royalty share of a take-or-pay 
buy out.
In its first ruling5 the Court of Appeals had reversed Judge Morris Arnold’s dismissal 
of the class action based upon the statute of limitations. It agreed that Arkansas’ three year
1With considerable assistance from others including, without limitation, Tim Dowd 
of Oklahoma City and Kevin Vaught of Fort Smith.
273 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1996), Cert. Den. 17 S.C. 65.
3Much has been said in conjecture about how Arkoma, Jones and McCoy 
obtained the properties from which the take or claim arose in the first place. It will not 
be repeated here.
4Then an Arkla Inc. subsidiary.
5980 F. 2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992).
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statute on implied contract6 applied, but disagreed with Judge Arnold’s commencement date 
of the period of limitations. In that ruling the Appeals Court also held that the Arkoma 
transaction gave rise to royalty liability. District Judge Jimm Hendren7 heard the case on 
remand. He held that the Eighth Circuit’s “holding” that the sale of Arkoma’s stock 
constituted, at least in part, a settlement of take-or-pay claims, was an “assumption” made 
by the Appeals Court, rather than a finding of law. Judge Hendren then concluded that the 
consideration paid for Arkoma was paid for the value of the company, rather than in 
settlement of the take-or-pay claim.
In its second opinion the Eighth Circuit Court stated clearly that its finding that the 
sale of the company was a settlement of the take-or-pay claims was indeed a conclusion of 
law and that it was binding upon the District Court as the “law of the case”. The Court of 
Appeals went on to hold that the liability to royalty owners is primary as to Jones and 
McCoy8 and secondary as to Arkla.9
The case is now before Judge Hendren on its second remand. He will attempt to 
determine what portion of the stock purchase price should be allocated to the take-or-pay 
settlement and then determine the allocation of damages among the class members, giving 
credit for those owners who are not entitled to share in the class’ recovery. Don’t be 
surprised by at least one more appeal.
While the Klein case is certainly notorious, it is not likely to be much of a precedent 
because its facts are so convoluted. In fact, most courts which have recently considered 
claims of royalty liability upon more straight-forward take-or-pay settlements have held 
against the royalty owners. Probably the most important of these cases is TransAmerican 
v. Finkelstein10, in which the Texas Court of Appeals, en banc, withdrew its previous 
opinion11 which had allowed Finkelstein to share in TransAmerican’s take-or-pay settlement 
on an equity theory similar to that of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Klein. In its
6A.C.A. § 16-56-105.
7Judge Arnold had, by then, assumed a seat on the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.
8Under a theory of unjust enrichment, because they got the money.
9Under a theory of breach of the implied covenant to market gas upon favorable
terms.
10733 S.W. 2d 591 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1996)
11That previous opinion is appended to the dissenting opinion beginning at 733 
S.W. 2d 600.
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rehearing the en banc court applied more traditional reasoning. It concluded that the lease 
contract provided for royalties to be paid on production of oil or gas and that no production 
could have occurred until oil or gas was severed from the ground. Thus, the Texas rule 
now appears to be that no royalties are due upon the payment of take-or-pay settlements 
until recoupment gas is produced, and if the settlement is non recoupable, so that 
corresponding gas is never severed from the ground, no royalties are due at all. The case 
was a four-to-three decision and inspired a spirited dissent.
Unfortunately, before the en banc rehearing in Finkelstein, a United States District 
court, anticipating Mississippi law, had relied upon the earlier Finkelstein opinion12, holding 
that Mississippi would follow Texas law and give royalty owners a share of non-recoupable 
take-or-pay settlement proceeds. In that case, Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc.13 the District 
Court went to great lengths to explain how Mississippi, absent controlling Mississippi case 
law, relies heavily upon Texas law for precedent in mineral law cases. Alas, the District 
Court was relying upon a Texas case whose opinion was about to be withdrawn.
The same issue was decided in Oklahoma in Roye Realty v. Watson.14 In that case the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the authorities were split on the issue, but that 
the better rule was that royalties were due only upon production and that production 
required severance from the ground. Thus, the court denied the royalty owner’s claim to 
a share of non-recoupable take-or-pay settlement proceeds.
Meanwhile, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals upheld the application of the Oklahoma 
gross production tax15 to a recoupable take or pay settlement, relying upon the language of 
the gross receipts tax statute. It also upheld the statute against constitutional challenge.16 
So, in Oklahoma, royalty owners cannot share in take-or-pay settlements, but the State of 
Oklahoma can tax them.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held in Independent Petroleum Association
12No w  withdrawn by the en banc opinion.
13925 F.Supp. 1163 (N.D. Miss. 1996)
14__ P. 2 d ___(Okla. 1996)
15Similar to the Arkansas Severance Tax, but specifically taxing payments made as 
result of the purchaser’s failure or refusal to purchase gas.
16In the Matter o f the Gross Production and Petroleum Excise Tax Protest o f Arkla, 
Inc., Noram Energy Corporation v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 919 P. 2d 1151 (Okla. 
App. 1996).
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of America v. Babbitt17 that the Federal Government was not entitled to collect royalties on 
non-recoupable take-or-pay settlement payments at all, and that royalties on recoupable 
payments were not due until actual production of recoupment gas. This case is consistent 
with a previous Fifth Circuit ruling on similar facts,18 and is consistent with the recent Texas 
and Oklahoma decisions.
1792 F. 3d 1248 (D. C. Cir. 1996)
18Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
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D. C. Co u r t  o f  Appe a l s  Fu r t h e r  De r e g u l a t e s  F.E.R.C.
Ru l i n g  De r e g u l a t i n g  No r a m 's  Un b u n d l e d  Gas  Ga t h e r i n g  Sy s t e m
In another important decision, the D. C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the F.E.R.C. 
ruling which had permitted Noram Gas Transmission Company to “spin down” its gas 
gathering facilities to a separate affiliate, Noram Field Services, and thus to operate the 
gathering facilities without F.E.R.C. regulation.19 Conoco and numerous intervenors20 21had 
challenged the F.E.R.C. determination that the gathering facilities were sufficiently 
“separate” to permit unbundling from the regulated facilities. The Court of Appeals not 
only permitted the spin-down and deregulation, it invalidated that part of the F.E.R.C. 
ruling which had required Noram Field Services to grant existing producers on the system 
a nondiscriminatory default gathering contract for an initial two year period. The Circuit 
Court held that F.E.R.C. was without authority to place such a condition upon its 
relinquishment of jurisdiction, while upholding F.E.R.C.’s approval of the “spin down.”
Ar k a n s a s  Su pr e m e  Co u r t  Ho l d s  t h a t  Ju r i s d i c t i o n  t o  En j o i n  
Co n s t r u c t i o n  o f  a  Gas  Pi pe l i n e  i s  in  Ch a n c e r y  Co u r t , n o t  t h e  P.S.C.
Southwestern Gas Company v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Corporation21 involved a 
contract made by an independent gas producer22 to sell gas directly to a glass manufacturing 
plant located within the city limits of Van Buren. Arkansas Oklahoma, the gas utility 
serving Van Buren, sued to enjoin the construction of the pipeline, citing a number of 
reasons why the injunction was in the public’s interest. A temporary restraining order 
followed. The Chancery Judge then held a hearing on the continuance of the temporary 
restraining order and without warning converted the temporary restraining order into a 
permanent injunction.23 On appeal the Appellants contended that only the Arkansas Public
19Conoco, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 90 F. 3d 536 (D. C. Cir.
1996).
20One of these intervenors was Arkansas Royalty Membership.
21325 Ark. 378, 925 S.W. 2d 164 (1996)
22Fred Waelder.
23Thus sending the case into a procedural tailspin from which it has not yet 
recovered. The Chancellor decided, upon remand, that the Supreme Court had 
determined that his hearing on the temporary restraining order was a trial upon the 
merits of the case and refused to permit Arkansas Oklahoma to introduce additional 
evidence justifying the injunction at the remand hearing. Notice of appeal has been filed 
from that ruling, so the Supreme Court will probably see the case again.
5
Service Commission had jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of a pipeline. The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument, holding that Chancery jurisdiction was proper. However, the 
Supreme Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to justify the granting of the 
permanent injunction.
Ar k a n s a s  Roy al t y  De e d  Co n s t r u e d  t o  Co n v e y  a  
“Fr a c t io n a l  Sh a r e ” Ra t h e r  t h a n  a  “Fr a c t io n  o f  a  Sh a r e ”
A year just wouldn’t be a year without at least one decision construing an ambiguous 
South Arkansas royalty deed. 1996 was no exception. The case was Parham v. Worthen 
Trust Company.24 The granting clause of the deed in question provides:
That we, Claude L. Smith and Helen E. Smith...grant, bargain, sell, convey, 
set over and assign and deliver unto the said I. L. and J. P. Cooper the 
following to-wit: An undivided 1/16 interest in and to all of the oil, gas and 
other minerals in the soil and under the surface thereof that may be produced 
from the land hereinafter described.
Unfortunately, other language in the deed confused the issue:
...said undivided 1/16 interest in the oil, gas and other minerals herein 
conveyed is to cover and apply to that portion only, which is 1/2 of 1/8 of the 
oil, gas and other minerals, reserved by the grantor herein, his heirs or 
assigns, in any lease for the development of oil, gas and other minerals now 
in existence, or that may hereafter be executed and delivered to any lessee...
And
...it being the intention of the parties hereto that this grant in no way shall 
prevent or interfere with the grant herein or his heirs or assigns in their own 
name to lease the land herein described for the purpose of developing for oil, 
gas and other minerals, the grant herein giving the grantee a mineral interest 
only to 1/16 of the oil, gas or other minerals to be delivered out of any royalty 
existing by virtue of any lease now on said land, or any that may be placed on 
said land by any party.
The Appellants, holding through the grantee of the deed, contended that this 
language mandated the conclusion that the conveyance was a “fraction of a share” royalty, 
entitling them to one-half of the one-sixth royalty on the new lease which the owner of the 
executory interest had negotiated. Their argument was not persuasive. The Arkansas 
Supreme Court agreed with the Appellees that the effect of the deed was to create a
24236 Ark. 754,__ S.W. 2 d ___ (1996).
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“fractional share” royalty, fixed at one-sixteenth, regardless of the fractional royalty provided 
for in the subsequent lease.
This opinion was authored by Justice Andree Layton Roaf. It is quite well written, 
citing its reliance both upon Williams and Meyers Oil and Gas Law and upon professor 
Phillip Norvell’s recent article on the subject of non-participating royalty interests.25 
Ar k a n s a s  Jo i n t  Te n a n c y  m a y  b e  D i s s o l v e d  b y  a  
Co n v e y a n c e  f r o m  On e  Co -t e n a n t  t o  a  St r a n g e r
Noland v. Noland26 involved a first conveyance by a mother and father to themselves 
and to two of their four adult children as joint tenants with right of survivorship and a later 
conveyance by the father to a family trust of the father’s undivided interest, after the 
mother’s death. The Chancellor had set aside the second conveyance upon alternate 
grounds. First, he held that the beneficiaries of the trust, having procured the second 
conveyance, had the burden of proving that the father was competent and that the 
conveyance did not result from undue influence from the beneficiaries. He held that the 
beneficiaries had failed to meet this burden of proof. Alternatively, the Chancellor held that 
a deed from one joint tenant to a stranger to the tenancy is a nullity.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the result because it agreed with the 
Chancellor’s analysis of the burden of proof issue. However, the Court specifically stated 
that the Chancellor was wrong about joint tenancy. The court recited the black letter rule 
of law that a conveyance from a joint tenant to a stranger is valid, but that it destroys the 
joint tenancy and results in a tenancy in common between the remaining former joint 
tenants and the stranger.
Un f e n c e d  Wel l  i n  Ur b a n  Ar e a  He l d  “Un r e a s o n a b l y  Da n g e r o u s ’’ i n  Lo u i s i a n a  
Ca s e  In v o l v in g  a n  In j u r y  t o  a  Ch i l d  Wh o  Ma y  Ha v e  Be e n  Pl a y in g  o n  t h e  Pu m p
Killough v. Bituminous Casualty Corp.27 involved a nine year old child who was 
seriously injured when his leg and foot became trapped in the pumping unit of a stripper 
oil well located near a school and playground in the town of Hosston, Louisiana. The child 
claimed to have been picking blackberries in the vicinity of the well and to have merely 
fallen into the pumping unit. The opinion belies suspicion that the child was, in fact, playing 
on the pump. The well, like almost all wells in the area, was not fenced. The Louisiana
25 Phillip E. Norvell, Pitfalls in Developing Lands Burdened by Nonparticipating 
Royalty, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 934, 937 (1995)
2655 Ark. App. 617,__ S.W. 2 d ___ (1996).
27674 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 1996).
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Bench trial was held February 21, 22, 23, March 15, and April 6, 1995. The 
trial judge also made an on-site inspection of the accident site. In rendering 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court found that the child was 
injured by the well pump in question. The court further found that the well 
site was open to the public without adequate warnings, safety barriers, or 
fences, and that such condition rendered it unreasonably dangerous. However, 
the trial judge stated his belief that the child was not entirely honest in his 
account of how the injury occurred and that the child was actually playing on 
the pump well when he was injured. Nonetheless, the trial court ruled that, 
based upon the totality of the evidence, the child was picking berries near the 
oil well "when he happened upon the well pump and perhaps in fact slipped."
In assessing damages, the trial judge further noted that he was not overly 
impressed with the health care plan established by the plaintiffs experts. The 
trial court awarded to the plaintiff damages of $230,736.08, subject to any 
applicable medical bill liens, plus legal interest from date of judicial demand; 
this sum included $155,000 for general damages.
The Court of Appeals generally upheld the trial court’s award, although it imposed a 10% 
comparative fault factor. The appellate court specifically agreed with the trial court that the 
mere existence of the unfenced well in this urban area was “unreasonably dangerous”.
Pe n n s y l v a n i a  Su pr e m e  Co u r t  Co n s t r u e s  Am b i g u o u s  
Re s e r v a t i o n  in  De e d  a s  Re s e r v a t i o n  o f  Al l  O i l  a n d  Gas
In the case of Sheaffer v. Caruso28 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was called upon 
to interpret the following language in a conveyance:
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING from First Tract and Second Tract all the 
coal and mining rights and the oil and gas as fully as the same have been 
excepted and reserved or conveyed by former owners.
Relying heavily upon the grantor’s use of the word “RESERVING” in addition to the word 
“EXCEPTING”, the court held that this language reserved 100% of the oil and gas to the 
grantors instead of merely limiting their warranty as to a previously reserved one-third 
interest. While the deed’s language is highly ambiguous, this writer doubts that the grantor’s 
intention was to reserve minerals other than the one-third reserved by the prior owner. 
Obviously the Pennsylvania court thought otherwise. Indeed, that is what “ambiguous” 
means.
Court of Appeals summarized the trial courts ruling as follows:
28676 A. 2d 204 (Penn. 1996)
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Cu r r e n t  Br i n e  Ca s e  Spo t l i g h t s  St a t u t e  o f  Lim i t a t i o n s  Is s u e s
Some may be familiar with the currently raging controversy in South Arkansas over 
Smackover Formation brine containing relatively high concentrations of bromide salts. Part 
of this controversy involves lawsuits against Great Lakes Chemical Corporation alleging that 
tail brine from Great Lakes’ salt water disposal wells invaded unleased lands of various 
plaintiffs, displacing valuable brine and causing damage actionable under the rule of Jameson 
v. Ethyl Corp.29 There are two such suits currently pending. The first, Deltic Farm and 
Timber Co., Inc. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corporation,30 involves the individual claim for 
damages of Deltic.31 The other case, Wooley, et.al. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corporation, et 
al32 seeks to become a class action brought on behalf of all formerly unleased owners within 
Great Lakes’ three Union County brine production units33 recently formed by the Arkansas 
Oil and Gas Commission.34 In the Deltic case United States District Judge Harry Barnes 
has issued a partial summary judgment that Deltic’s damages, if any, are limited to those 
sustained during the three years immediately preceding the filing of its complaint, because 
Arkansas law35 imposes a three year Statute of Limitations upon each of its several alleged 
causes of action.
Deltic had argued that Judge Barnes should impose the so-called “discovery rule” to 
the limitations issue so that the limitations period would not have commenced until Deltic 
actually knew or reasonably should have known about the alleged damage claim. Judge 
Barnes declined to apply the “discovery rule” under the circumstances, since Great Lakes’ 
disposal and production activities were fully disclosed in public filings with the Oil and Gas 
Commission. He further held that, even if the “discovery rule” was applied, Deltic 
reasonably should have ascertained its alleged cause of action from public information 
available to it for more than three years prior to its commencement of the case.
29271 Ark. 621, 609 S.W. 2d 346 (1980).
30Case No. 95-1090, U. S. Dist. Ct., W.D. Ark., El Dorado Division.
31Until very recently Deltic was a wholly owned subsidiary of Murphy Oil 
Corporation.
32Case No. 96-302-2, Union County Circuit Court, 2nd. Div.
330ver 100,000 acres.
34A.O.G.C. Orders No. BU 1-95 (South Plant Unit), BU2-95 (Central Unit) and 
BU3-95 (West Plant Unit).
35A.C.A. § 16-56-105.
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Deltic sought and received Judge Barnes’ permission to take an interlocutory appeal 
of this decision, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has now accepted the interlocutory 
appeal.36 The Court of Appeals is likely to decide the case in 1997. Obviously the issue 
involved has significance which goes well beyond the players in the case.
36The cases is docketed in the Eighth Circuit as Case No. 97-1158WAED.
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Le g i s l a t iv e  De v e l o pm e n t s
Ok l a h o m a  Le g i s l a t i o n  Pr e s c r i b e s  Sh a pe  a n d  Fo n t  o f  Re c o r d a b l e  Do c u m e n t s
In Oklahoma, unlike Arkansas, county clerks are required to maintain indexes of 
instruments affecting title to real property on a tract basis. These public officials are not 
without political power. In 1996 they persuaded the Oklahoma Legislature to prescribe a 
cure for a pet peeve. These people were tired of trying to index multi-tract documents, like 
blanket assignments of oil and gas leases, which sometimes contain exhibits listing hundreds 
of leases, in no particular order, in small print, if, indeed, they are legible at all. The result 
was Oklahoma House Bill 2796, enacted by the 1996 Oklahoma Legislature and signed by 
the Governor.
This law strictly prescribes the form for recordable instruments. It even regulates 
such matters as font size37 and margins.38 Even more of a potential problem is a 
requirement that legal descriptions referring to parts of governmental subdivisions must be 
to the nearest quarter section.39
Oil and Gas producers and attorneys were unable to stop the passage of this act or 
to persuade Governor Keating to veto it. However, after it was signed, its enforcement was 
enjoined by a District Court judge in Oklahoma County. Hope is that it will be repealed
37Printed instruments must be in at least 12 point type, the font in which this 
paper is printed.
38At least a one inch top margin and one-half inch bottom margin and side 
margins are mandated.
39Arguably “the north half of Section 6" must be written “the northwest quarter 
and the northeast quarter of section 6.”
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or, at least, modified into something more reasonable.
Al l  Eye s  Ar e  o n  Lit t l e  Ro c k 's  Bia n n u a l  Le g i s l a t i v e  Fo l l i e s  
Watch out boys and girls, its an odd numbered year. That means that the Arkansas
Legislature is in session, whether it is needed or not. As of the printing deadline for this
paper it is too early to report the final result of the Legislature’s work. Much is going on.
The author will try to keep up with it and report further when he delivers this paper to the
Natural Resources Law Institute.
Currenly pending bills include:
Bi l l s  Re l a t i n g  t o  Th e  Ar k a n s a s  Oil  a n d  Gas  Co m m i s s i o n
1. HB 1036. Appropriation for a new A.O.G.C. office building in Fort Smith.
2. HB 1213. Biannual appropriation for A.O.G.C. This is sometimes a surprisingly 
controversial piece of legislation as individual representatives and senators vent 
the anger of their constituents against the Oil and Gas industry by taking it out on 
the Commission.
3. HB 1286. Would increase the stipend for A.O.G.C. Commissioners from $50 to 
$75 per meeting attended, plus expenses. Can these guys be trusted with that 
kind of money?
Bi l l s  Re l a t in g  t o  Le a s i n g  o f  Sta t e  La n d s
2
1. HB 119 . No state agency nor agent may lease state lands, including, presumably 
oil and gas leases, without the “advice” of the Legislative Counsel. If the 
Legislative Counsel does not advise within 45 days, the agency or agent may act 
without “advice.” Tax forfeited lands are exempted. This bill, if passed will slow 
the procedure for obtaining a lease on state lands. It is hard to imagine a good 
reason for its passage. Obviously somebody leased some legislator’s sacred cow 
without asking.
2. HB 1293. No lease mining or production of non-renewable resources from lands 
within state parks may be executed without approval at a state wide general 
election. This is an obvious overreaction to public outcry about commercial 
diamond mining in the Crater of Diamonds State Park. It could be a real 
problem if passed, because it will effectively make it impossible to form a drilling
12
unit which includes state park lands without an A.O.G.C. order “spacing-out” the 
lands. Such an order should, theoretically, include a finding that the state park 
lands would not be drained by unit operations, probably an untruth. This bill 
should never be passed. If it must be passed, it should be amended to exclude oil 
and gas leases with “no surface operations” clauses.
Ot h e r  Bil l s  o f  In t e r e s t
1. HB 1127. The Uniform Probate Code: This bill has failed to pass in previous 
sessions but has considerable support, primarily from the American Association of 
Retired Persons. It makes sweeping changes to probate law which are more than 
merely procedural. If it is enacted every landman and attorney working in 
Arkansas will have to be re-educated. It is not really a bad law, but there is 
considerable doubt whether it is really any better than the current Arkansas 
Probate Code.
2. HB 1414. This bill will prohibit the practice of releasing instruments by marginal 
notation after December 31, 1997. Marginal releases are already prohibited in 
those counties which do not have paper filing systems. Abstractors and title 
insurers would like to get rid of them altogether, as would landmen.
13
